

CONSCIENCE DEVELOPMENT AND FUNCTIONING

A SYNOPTIC ACCOUNT DRAWN FROM **CONSCIENCE WORKS***

(with special reference to the research of G. Kochanska)

By Matthew R. Galvin, M.D.^ξ



Cynthia had made sure the Fairchild children were bathed and in their pajamas before they could do any more playing. Now two-year-old Cathy was settling down with her dolls, her head in Cynthia's lap. Just a few minutes ago, Cathy had had a short tantrum in the bathtub. This had to do with Cynthia using less shampoo than was necessary to make the mounds of suds and bubbles that Cathy expected of shampoos. Cynthia got splashed and had a puddle of water to clean up. At first Cynthia was vexed.

^ξ Dr Galvin is currently in the practice of child and adolescent psychiatry, including consultation and service provision to **Children's Bureau Inc.**, Indiana School for the Blind and Damar in Indianapolis, In. He is Clinical Associate Professor in Psychiatry at Indiana University and serves as voluntary faculty, teaching with his wife Dr. Meg Gaffney in Introduction to Clinical Medicine I and Conscience Centered Psychiatric Ethics. He is author or co-author of several psycho-educational books for children, adolescents and adults. He is an active contributor to, and serves on the editorial board of, **Conscience Works**. He has been a member of the Board of the **Indiana Association for Infant and Toddler Mental Health** since 2004.

Then she reminded herself, "Cathy is in 'those terrible twos' when her favorite word is NO!"

It had taken several babysitting sessions at the Fairchild's before Cathy was able to see her parents leave without crying and carrying on. Now she looked forward to Cynthia spending the evening with only a brief whimper when her parents said 'goodnight'. Cynthia was especially pleased to hear the Fairchild's go on and on about how much the kids liked her and how she could get them to do things their parents couldn't. Cynthia had said, "Cathy if you finish up with your shampoo, we'll have time for playing with your dolls. Who did you say is your favorite doll?" Cathy stopped crying to consider Cynthia's question. After that the bath went smoothly, Cynthia saw to it that Cathy's hair was detangled, combed, blown dry and combed again. The proper pajamas were selected (but there were several different pajamas that were first tried and then discarded on the floor before the final selection was made). Cynthia coaxed Cathy to pick up and fold her clothes by suggesting they do it together.

"That's very good, Cathy," Cynthia said. "Now bring your dollies and let's see what Michael is doing."

After his bath Michael had proudly told Cynthia "I don't need any help getting dressed or brushing my hair." Michael was three and one half. When Cynthia and Cathy found Michael he was in his pajamas all right but they were inside out and backwards and sort of twisted at one sleeve so he couldn't get his arm through.

Cathy laughed and said "Michael's silly."

Michael was mad and blamed his sister, "You made me--" he said as he advanced towards his sister, hitting his fist in his hand. Cynthia said, "Now, Michael, Cathy didn't do anything. You just got tangled up, that's all. It happens to people all the time."

That seemed to calm Michael down and they were all able to go to the living room to play.

Cathy had her dolls. She was sleepily muttering to one: "Bad Dolly, you will get spanked," and to the other "Good Dolly, you didn't spill."

Michael played with his Lego's and watched TV. Cynthia took out a magic marker and a piece of paper. She began to draw. Michael noticed this and sidled over to her. "What you doing, Cynthia?"

"I'm doing a drawing."

"What you drawing?" he asked.

"My conscience."

"'Consin?" Michael was surprised. "My Grandma lives in Wish 'Consin."

"No, no, Michael, you're thinking of Wisconsin. I think your grandma lives in Wisconsin. It's a state. I'm drawing my conscience."

"What's that?" Michael asked.

"It's the part of me that helps me figure out what's good and bad." Cynthia said.

"Oh," said Michael, "I am a good boy."

"I know that, Michael," Cynthia replied while selecting another color.

"Some boys are naughty and that's a shame. I know three shames."

"Three shames?" Cynthia was interested in what Michael knew about shame.

"Yes. My Daddy told me." Michael continued, "Last Halloween, we made pumpkins into Jack O' Lanterns. Then we set them outside on the windowsill. Some very naughty boys came by very late--past their bedtime. They smashed our pumpkins. My Daddy and I didn't know until Mommy showed us the next morning. My Daddy said it was a shame."

"O.K. so that was the first shame?" Cynthia asked.

"Uh-huh," Michael said. "The second shame was when the cookie store at the mall closed up. Me and my Mommy liked those cookies."

"So what was the third shame?" Cynthia was looking at Michael with a big smile.

"I forgot the last shame."

"Have you ever been ashamed of yourself for something and your face got all hot and red and you couldn't look anybody in the eye?"

"No. Once my Mommy gave me sweat pants that were too loose on me. At preschool they fell down and everybody saw my underwear."

"That's embarrassing, I know," Cynthia was sympathetic. "Was that the third shame?"

"No. That was embarrassing. There's another shame." Michael said. "But it went out of my head." Michael came closer, snuggling a little. "That's a good drawing, Cynthia. I want to help draw. Please."

"Thanks, Michael, I have to do this by myself. Why don't you play with your Lego's for awhile?"

Whenever Cynthia tried to do homework or a project while she was babysitting, she felt funny. She thought she should be playing with the kids instead. It wasn't that Mrs. Fairchild insisted that she play with the kids. Mrs. Fairchild had said it was O.K. to bring homework over to do. Cynthia just didn't like the look of disappointment on Michael's face when she said she needed to study. Once he told her "You don't like me. You won't play with me." He even told his mother. Cynthia was about to defend herself by saying she had had to study for a science test. Mrs. Fairchild just said, "Don't worry, Cynthia, Michael's just trying to make you

feel guilty. He pulls that on me all the time. He just refuses to understand the world doesn't revolve around him."

Tonight Cynthia decided to ignore Michael's plea for company while he played. Cathy was sound asleep now. Cynthia pulled up the quilt around Cathy's shoulders, thinking she'd finish her drawing before she carried Cathy upstairs to her bedroom. Cynthia lost track of time while she worked on the drawing. She looked up and had a moment's worry when she realized Michael was no longer in the room playing Lego's. She gently lifted Cathy's head from her lap and scooted out from under her. Then she started towards Michael's room. Only he wasn't there! Now, Cynthia's moment of worry had turned into something longer and stronger. Still she refused to become frantic or panicky. She went out into the hallway and headed towards the staircase. Just then Michael was coming up the stairs. He said, "Cynthi, come see my drawing." Cynthia sighed a sigh of relief. She said " Michael, where have you been? I've been looking for you." Michael took her hand and repeated, " I made a drawing for Mommy and Daddy. Come look." Cynthia was confused. Michael did not take her into his room as she had expected. Instead they went into Mr. and Mrs. Fairchild's room. She turned on the light. He led her to the closet, a big walk-in closet full of nooks and crannies, coats and dresses and lots of boxes. He pulled aside his mother's skirts with a grand gesture, just as if he were unveiling a great work of art. There in glorious, luminescent magic marker color was Michael's drawing---on the closet wall! It wasn't a small drawing either. And it wasn't in light colors. "I drew my 'consin," Michael said proudly....

The above excerpt (and illustration by Sandra Laramore) from The Conscience Celebration¹ depicts encounters among three persons of conscience at very different stages of their moral development. What patterns can be discerned as progression is made from someone even younger than Cathy to someone even older than Cynthia? Will progression normally occur according to invariant hierarchical stages? Does the process admit of alternative tracks? Can there be accelerations (as well as arrests, interruptions and delays)? Under what conditions of psychopathological interference do trajectories become deviant? How can grown-ups who aspire to be stewards of moral nature, learn to conserve, sustain and enable flourishing in the moral development of children?

DEVELOPMENT²

The human brain develops through complex patterns of differentiation and integration stimulated by interpersonal experience and recursive processes (Siegel, 1999).ⁱ When properly nurtured, most forms of development reach an optimum level, after which functional maintenance becomes the ongoing concern. Within limits, human beings have the capacity to influence various kinds of development in themselves and others. Most parents, teachers, and professionals involved with children are motivated to cultivate moral sensitivity in children. Children demonstrate a natural moral impulse in the second year of life as they begin to place personal actions, outcomes, and reactions of others into good and bad categories (Kagan, 1998).ⁱⁱ Thereafter, interactive moral learning opportunities between children and trusted adults are everyday occurrences (Hoffman, 2000).ⁱⁱⁱ

Development³ is the story of an individual's progress in moving from less to more psychological integration and differentiation, utilizing the biologically based systems that enable learning by governing **cognitive functions, attachment, and emotion**. Coordination of these systems in interaction with the environment allows a person to construct increasingly complex psychological **meanings** in living.

Cognitive functions. Construction of meaning requires that *perceptions* be tolerated, absorbed and organized. Integration of perceptions involves the ability to attend without extremes in affective arousal, to be optimally stimulated between a lower orienting threshold and an upper aversion threshold. When orienting, an infant turns toward a novel stimulus and suppresses bodily movement. Physiologic accompaniments to orienting include pupil dilation, brain wave desynchronization, increased galvanic skin response, suppression of respiratory frequency, decreased peripheral blood flow, and an initial slowing of the heart rate, all of which habituate with repeated exposure (Dawson, 1991; NOVA, 1985).^{i,ii} At the upper threshold, overly intense stimuli elicit the aversive response characterized by heart rate acceleration and failure to habituate on repeated exposure. To the extent these thresholds are biologically determined, individuals may have an arousal/aversion range that typifies their ability to tolerate novel events throughout the lifespan. Meaning is contingent on memory systems that under-gird internal representational models. Malignant episodic memories are psycho-biologically linked affective, cognitive and arousal functions in stable toxic configurations; they are central to the definition of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD; Terr, 1988; Perry and Pollard, 1998).^{iii, iv,}


Bowlby conceptualized **attachment** as a biological system with the proximal aim of providing a secure base from which the young may safely explore the world

and a distal aim of preserving the species. Deficiencies and deviancies in caregiver attachment abilities have been causally linked to insecurity, social avoidance, social resistance and emotional/cognitive disorganization, as well as behavior outside the realm of societal acceptability.

Construction of meaning requires that **emotion** be recognized, given context and modulated. Izard^v recognized ten discrete emotions that serve as primary motivators in human development: interest, joy, surprise, distress, anger, disgust, contempt, fear, shame, and guilt. Deficiencies and deviancies in emotional homeostasis are related not only to affective disorders but also to social relatedness. In the moral development of the child, deficiencies and deviancies may mean a moral emotional set point fails to acquire a "be good/feel good" setting.

CONSCIENCE: THE HEART OF THE PERSONALITY⁴

Stages of Conscience Development




Think of younger persons you know. Whatever their ages, they have already journeyed through some *stages* in their moral development. Then too, they have other stages still to negotiate.

Very young persons of conscience depend upon others to help them figure out what's right and wrong (or good and bad). That is called the *external stage*. As they mature, persons of conscience gradually bring moral awareness inside them and may even think of it as a part of their body. That is called the *brain/heart stage*. Still later, conscience becomes personalized. That is called the *heart/mind or personified stage*. Then conscience may go through a period in which it seems more or less confounded (the *confused stage*) before it is more fully put together (the *integrated stage*).

Here are the Stages of Conscience Development (in parentheses you will find an age, more or less, when we discern a person is at that stage):⁵

- I. External Stage (around 5 years old)
- II. Brain/Heart Stage (around 7 years old)
- III. Personified or Heart/Mind Stage (around 12 years old)
- IV. Confused Stage (around 16 years old)
- V. Integrated Stage (around 18+ years old)

Here is the narrative and pictorial image rendered by one of the youngest of our subjects (we have entitled it "A Slippery Slope"):



A Slippery Slope

A child knew he was being good, he says, "When the teacher didn't tell me to sit down."

In his drawing, he shows what happened while riding bikes with his cousin. "The hill was straight down, my cousin told me to stop but I didn't" When he approached the bottom he had to drag his feet in the mud. His cousin told him "that was bad and he would never ride bikes with me again". The same child describes another

bike adventure with his cousin who told him to pull over. He didn't and "flipped over the handlebars."

Conscience in Adversity²


Keeping in mind the points made earlier about development in general, one might expect that adversities of some sorts, when tempered in certain ways, might actually accelerate the child's advancement through developmental stages.

Intrinsic protective factors (including a genetic endowment rendering the child LESS susceptible to PTSD --and successive conditions such as depression—and/or neurobiological sequelae from exposure to stress, interactive with temperamental factors, which create *de novo* vulnerability to mood and disruptive behavior disorders), extrinsic protective and ameliorating factors such as adaptive, supportive responses from caregivers and the agencies or institutions upon which caregivers depend, as well as characteristics of the adversity attenuating its impact would be expected to dispose to more favorable outcomes. With respect to advancement in conscience formation, this expectation seemed to be partially borne out by a study of children who were victims of an earthquake in Armenia in 1988 conducted by Goenjian and colleagues. However, there were costs attached to

the apparent accelerations, for example, coexistence of PTSD with a more advanced stage of conscience.^{iv}

On the other hand, the impression one has from available research is that maltreatment at an early age has the potential for altering the child's developmental trajectory both immediately and in ways that do not become apparent until stage salient developmental milestones are neared. Nowhere is this more apparent than in social cognitive, social emotional, valuational and volitional development, which depends upon the interplay of temperament, secure attachment and autonomy.^v

Domains of Conscience



Have you ever heard someone exclaim: "That person must have no conscience at all!" As you have been thinking about development and how it can be arrested or how it can go awry, you may find yourself less satisfied with that kind of description of any person, even if the person in question has very serious behavioral problems. If you have ever been described that way by anyone, you may well wonder how such a description could ever really be of any help in healing or making you better. It seems too much, too overwhelming, too global. What if the idea of conscience could be broken down into parts and each part could be examined for strengths and weaknesses to see how the whole could be made to work better?


An important thing to observe about conscience is that it can be divided into *domains*. In brief, the first domain, which anchors all the other domains, is called:

Conceptualization of Conscience

It can be described as how inclusive and abstract a person is in defining a personal conscience. You might also think of this domain as including *moral imagination*—what we use to put together metaphors and images to describe our selves as moral beings and what we use to solve moral dilemmas. The picture of conscience to the left was created by a twelve-year-old girl in the days when most recording devices used audiotape cassettes. She called attention to the modality buttons, which included 'record', 'fast forward', 'rewind', 'stop', 'process' and 'play.' She assured us that while she could not turn off the power, she could push the entire machine into the back of her mind where it would be out of the way. Her conscience is at the Personified Stage. But it might also be classified according to the part of conscience about which that person is most aware. In this drawing we can see a

very **Conceptual** or **Morally Imaginative** Conscience because of the way it pulls her ideas and images together.

Look at the following conscience drawings (the artists/subjects were each about twelve years old):



Now choose the most likely match for each **drawing** above with a **set** below (notice each set includes the name, a description and a core concept for each conscience domain).

Moralization of attachment (Moral connections)

Developmental transitions in the youngster's response to parental prohibitions and demands based upon how s/he links feelings of security, empathy and 'ought-ness' to child-parent and other child-authority figure relationships.

- Core concept: *The Attachment-Empathy-Ought-ness Link*. In early childhood, a person develops a sense of ought-ness out of his/her need for physical and psychological security. As the child learns emotional cues as well as identifying those emotions in him/herself, s/he gradually learns that compliance (or noncompliance) with a parental prohibition or demand is followed by parental pleasure (or displeasure). Mutual pleasure is the desirable state because it satisfies the bedrock value of *connectedness*. The link is formed.

Moral-emotional responsiveness (Moral Emotions)

Developmental transitions in the way a child uses:

- 1) anxiety and mood to regulate moral behavior and
- 2) processes of reparation and healing after wrongdoing to regain the physical state normally experienced when feeling like a good person.

• Core concept: Moral emotional responsiveness is the barometer of the conscience. The barometer is established when the early ought-ness experiences are linked to regulation of emotions and their physiological manifestations. Awareness of an *am good-do good-feel good* state becomes the set point of moral emotional harmony on the barometer.

Moral volition (Moral choosing)

Developmental transitions in how a child uses his/her sense of autonomy in responding to and redefining rules of conscience.

• Core Concept: Autonomy and will allow a child to value being and doing as an individual. Autonomy and will become moralized as moral volition. The child gradually learns to make increasingly sophisticated judgment-derived choices about what s/he believes to be right or good. S/he combines what s/he has learned from others with his/her own moral intuitions, reasoning, defenses and risk-taking. Hard choices and courage are closely coordinated.

Moral valuation (Moral Values)

Developmental changes in the way a child justifies compliance or non-compliance with rules of conscience based on both reasoning and psychological defenses. This domain has three sub-domains based on how the child categorizes rules of conscience as:

*Authority-derived,
Self-derived and
Peer-derived.*

• Core concept: Basic psychological needs constitute bedrock values. The child learns that s/he ought to behave in certain ways for these bedrock values to be met. As the brain matures, learned ought-ness/behaviors become rules which in time, generalize to abstract values (e.g. trust, loyalty, justice, caring, tolerance). *The Valuation Triangle* resonates with dynamic interactions among *Authority, Peer* and *Self-derived* moral mandates.

(Answers: B, A, C, D)

Conscience Before Six

There is at least partial convergence of the psychobiological interpretations drawn from the conscience study conducted by Stilwell et al.^{6, 7,8,9,10,11,12} and ideas presented by Jerome Kagan:¹³

The human capacity for a moral motive and its associated emotions took from our primate ancestry a keen sensitivity to the voice, face, and actions of others but added five unique abilities:

- (1) to infer the thoughts and feelings of others,
- (2) to be self-aware
- (3) to apply the categories of good and bad to events and to self,
- (4) to reflect on past actions, and
- (5) to know that a particular act could have been suppressed.

The combination of these five talents created a novel system that first emerges in children in the second year and matures during the decade that follows...

Allowing for overlaps, there is remarkable correspondence among these five unique abilities characterized in the preceding excerpt on the one hand and, on the other hand, the domains of conscience drawn from children's and adolescents own accounts and images, respectively:

- (1) Moralization of emotion;
- (2) Conceptualization of conscience;
- (3) Moral valuation;
- (4) Conceptualization of conscience and Moral Valuation;
- (5) Moral volition.¹⁴

Findings based upon semistructured interviewing of older children and adolescents are also consonant with those of Kochanska and her colleagues^{15, 16,17,18,19,20} who have established a meaningful correspondence between younger children's narrative interpretations of hypothetical moral dilemmas and objective measures of their conscience functions. The "declarative knowledge" expressed in narrative form was associated with both past and contemporaneous "procedural" action tendencies and with maternal reports. Toddler and preschool age children's consciences were measured objectively at time 1 (ages 26 to 41 months) and again at time 2 (43-56 months), and according to narrative at time 2. Although the age ranges were relatively restricted, there was evidence of cross-sectional developmental trends,

as well as strong differences between time 1 and time 2, congruent with most theories depicting moral development as a gradual shift to more internalized regulation, growing empathy, and awareness of wrong-doing. Older preschoolers expressed more themes of empathy and guilt, more themes of confession/reparation, and fewer antisocial themes. Kochanska concludes that two developmental processes are important in conscience formation: the development of the tendency to experience affective discomfort, guilt and anxiety associated with wrong-doing and the development of behavioral control, the ability to inhibit a prohibited action. More recent contributions by Kochanska et al. to the study of conscience with respect to temperamental individual differences in *effortful control* have been among the subjects of a review of developing mechanisms of self-regulation.²¹ Self-regulation involves complex questions about the nature of volition (effortful control) and its relation to our genetic endowment and to social experience. Within cognitive psychology, the mechanisms thought to be involved in self-control are collectively called *attention*. Attention allows rapid changes in neural activity in local brain areas. Priority is produced, in the timeframe of milliseconds, by amplifying the amount of neural activity within the area performing the skill. When this is done voluntarily it is called *effortful attention*. Priming, in the timeframe of seconds or minutes, involves efficiently tuning the process in which automatic pathways are established, over minutes to days, by practice. Learning further involves the establishment of new connections stimulated by new associations over weeks, which eventuate, over additional weeks, in rule learning mediated by new structures, and, over years, development dependent upon more complex networks. Executive control is a second form of attention that emerges in the second year of life and is thought to involve the frontal midline. A psychobiological theoretical model of executive functions including response inhibition, nonverbal working memory, verbal working memory, self regulation of emotion and motivation, and reconstitution (e.g. processes of analysis and synthesis in self directed play) and the loci in the prefrontal regions that are implicated has been advanced by Barkley.¹²

In the most recent articulation of a theory of conscience developed by Kochanska and her colleagues based upon their longitudinal studies covering the first six years in the lifespan, the two major components of conscience are termed *moral emotions and moral conduct* compatible with rules and standards. An early discernible development is the child's eager, willing stance towards parental socialization (also termed committed compliance). Development is seen as influenced by biologically based temperament (in particular, fearfulness and effortful control) and features of socialization, including style of discipline and

quality of the parent-child relationship (specifically, early security).^{18, 19, 20} As has been demonstrated by Stilwell and her colleagues, the signatures of such early forms of conscience development elucidated by Kochanska can be detected in the responses of older children and adolescents to semi-structured interviews, conducted in accordance with the youth's cognitive maturity.

The Stewardship of Moral Nature

Aside from avoiding extremes in the continuum of caregiver casualty and ensuring the availability of supportive measures in adversity, those who aspire to be stewards of the moral nature of children should be mindful of Kochanska et al's findings: namely that there are salutary effects, early on, from the *mutually responsive orientation* of caregiver-child directly upon the child's *moral emotions* as well as indirectly upon *moral conduct* when mediated by the child's enjoyment and committed compliance. Stewardship can also take the form of directly engaging the moral sensitivity of the child. When a child presents an adult with something that isn't working right—a toy, a body part, or someone's meanness, most adults want to help correct the situation. Desire to make something "right" in response to someone else's needs or wrongs initiates the growth of moral sensitivity within relationships—relationships between parent-child, teacher-student, doctor-patient, friend-friend, community-member, among others.²

Stewards of the moral nature of children can clearly model and encourage virtuous striving, and, as the child matures, use explicit moral language to describe the stewards' own intentions as well as conduct. Values reveal their stamp when self-reflection and self-disclosure are made about intentions, attitudes as well as behavioral rules. Making explicit what has been tacit or procedural may take various forms, such "This is important because _____" or "I do this for the sake of _____." In the process, there is usually opportunity for recognition that to be a person of conscience does not mean operating exclusively by **best reasons** instead of **base motives**, but by striving to transfer, little by little, power from the latter to the former.

In considering the contours of conscience in each child and reckoning individual strengths and weaknesses, the steward can help the child develop competency in the domains of conscience, each considered as a biologically prepared capacity. In each domain, nature provides a *push* in the form of a bedrock or intrinsic value. There is also a *pull* from these very values as they are upheld and put into virtuous practice. A person of conscience acquires and strengthens skills in

conceptualization of conscience (or moral imagination) for the sake of **Moral Meaning**, in forming, sustaining and expanding moral attachments for the sake of **Connectedness**, in cultivating a repertory of moral emotional responses (including reparative and amendatory measures, such as forgiveness, and practices of gratitude) for the sake of **Equanimity**, in discovering and retrieving affirmative values for the sake of (or as might also be said, *in response to the allure of*) **Value** itself and in moving from autonomy to agency and eventually advocacy for the sake of developing **Freedom**.

IN SUMMARY, we have briefly visited a developmental theory of conscience which includes the features of 1) invariant hierarchical stages readily characterized in the lifespan between 5 and 17 years old with precursors identifiable even earlier in the lifespan, in recognizable patterns of progression with acceleration on the one hand, delay or interruption or arrest, on the other, 2) domains admitting of relative strengths and weaknesses and individualized contours of conscience within personhood and 3) intrinsic or bedrock values associated with the domains of conscience. The importance of the caregiver as well as the agencies and institutions supporting the various professions of care has, at every point, been implied.

* **Conscience Works, An On-line Periodical:**

<http://shaw.medlib.iupui.edu/conscience/>

(all electronically published materials are freely available for down loading)

1. Excerpted from: Galvin M & Stilwell B, illus. S. Ferraro, intro. M. Gaffney (1998): The Conscience Celebration: A Story About Moral Flourishing, **Conscience Works**, An On-line Periodical

2. Excerpted from: Stilwell B, Galvin M, Gaffney M (2006): Progress in conscience-sensitive psychiatry: assessment, diagnosis and treatment planning. **Conscience Works**, An On-line Periodical: *Theory, Research and Clinical Applications*, 2 (1): 5-30.

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ii. Kagan J (1998): **Three Seductive Ideas**. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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v. Galvin MR, Stilwell BM, Shekhar A, Kopta M and Goldfarb S (1997): Maltreatment, conscience functioning and dopamine beta hydroxylase in emotionally disturbed boys" **Child Abuse and Neglect, the International Journal** 21(1): 83-92.

3. Excerpted from: Galvin M, Stilwell B, Adinamis A & Kohn A (2001): Conscience sensitive diagnosis of maltreated children and adolescents. In **Conscience Works**, an On-line Periodical, *Theory, Research and Clinical Application*, 1(1): 1-81.

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4. Excerpted from: Galvin M, Stilwell B, Gaffney M, Satala M, Hamilton T (in process): **A Guide to Conscience**.

5. These descriptions and the drawing of conscience were obtained from: Stilwell B, Galvin M, Kopta M: **Conceptualization of Conscience**, Indiana University Medical Education Resources Program, videotape VC5700, 10/30/90.

6. Stilwell B, Galvin M (1985): Conceptualization of conscience in 11-12 year olds, **Journal of American Academy of Child Psychiatry**.24: 630-636.

7. Stilwell B, Galvin M, Kopta SM (1991): Conceptualization of conscience in normal children and adolescents, ages 5 to 17, **Journal of American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry**. 30:16-21.

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12. Stilwell B, Galvin M, Kopta S (2001): **Right Versus Wrong: Raising a Child with a Conscience**. Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press.
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